
- John Ternus Becomes Apple CEO: What Changed?
- Apple’s New Leadership Team Under CEO John Ternus
- John Ternus vs Tim Cook: What Changes at Apple?
- Apple’s Business and Valuation at the Start of the John Ternus Era
- How Investors Should Judge John Ternus as Apple CEO
- Scenario One: Apple Becomes a Product Company With an Operations Safety Net
- Scenario Two: Apple Turns AI Into a Device Network, Not Just a Chatbot
- Scenario Three: Apple Builds a Family of New Interfaces
- Can a Foldable iPhone Really Move Apple Stock?
- Why Apple’s 2.5 Billion Device Installed Base Could Be the Bigger Opportunity
- What Is Unlikely to Change Under Apple CEO John Ternus?
- Apple Stock 2030 Scenario Analysis: Bear, Base and Bull Cases
- What Could Go Wrong Under a Product-Led CEO?
- The John Ternus Scorecard Investors Should Track
- Author's Take
Apple's most consequential product under John Ternus may not be a foldable iPhone, smart glasses or a home robot. It may be a new way of running Apple itself. Just eight days after taking over as CEO, Ternus leads a company worth about $4.65 trillion, with more than 2.5 billion active devices and one of the most profitable consumer ecosystems ever built.
The easy storyline is that an engineer has replaced an operator. The more useful question is whether Apple can become more product-led without weakening the financial and operational machine Tim Cook spent 15 years building.
Let's break down what John Ternus has actually inherited, where his engineering instincts could change Apple's products and AI strategy, what is unlikely to change and what the numbers say Apple must deliver by 2030.
John Ternus Becomes Apple CEO: What Changed?
John Ternus became Apple CEO on September 1, 2026. Tim Cook moved into the newly created role of executive chair and Apple said he would continue helping with certain matters, including engagement with policymakers around the world.
Ternus joined Apple's product design team in 2001, became a vice president of Hardware Engineering in 2013 and joined the executive team as senior vice president in 2021. Apple credits him with important work across the iPad, AirPods, iPhone, Mac and Apple Watch. His teams also worked on durability, repairability, lower-carbon materials and the Mac's evolution during the Apple silicon era.
Apple's first major product event under Ternus is scheduled for September 9. Reuters reported that Apple is widely expected to use it to unveil a premium folding iPhone. Whatever appears on stage, however, will not be a clean test of his first eight days as CEO. Major Apple products spend years in development. Ternus can reasonably receive some credit because he led hardware engineering, but the event cannot tell investors what a Ternus-designed Apple looks like from the CEO's office.
That will take longer.
| What changed | What the evidence says |
| CEO | John Ternus took over on September 1, 2026 |
| Executive chair | Tim Cook remains involved, particularly in global policy engagement |
| Operations | COO Sabih Khan runs planning, procurement, manufacturing, logistics and product fulfilment |
| Hardware and silicon | Chief Hardware Officer Johny Srouji leads Hardware Engineering and hardware technologies |
| CEO incentives | $3 million salary and a $55 million fiscal 2027 target equity award |
| Performance link | 75% of the equity award is tied to Apple's total shareholder return relative to the S&P 500 |
Source: Apple, Apple leadership pages and Apple's September 1, 2026 Form 8-K/A.
Apple’s New Leadership Team Under CEO John Ternus
It is tempting to reduce the transition to one sentence: Cook was a supply-chain specialist while Ternus is a product engineer. That is directionally right, but incomplete.
Cook did not merely run operations. Under him, Apple expanded Services into a business generating more than $100 billion a year, pushed deeper into wearables and health, moved the Mac to Apple-designed chips, returned enormous amounts of capital and managed relationships with governments and suppliers across the world. Apple says annual revenue rose from $108 billion in fiscal 2011 to more than $416 billion in fiscal 2025 while market value grew from roughly $350 billion to $4 trillion by the time the succession was announced.
Ternus does not need to recreate all of that personally. Apple now appears to have distributed key parts of the Cook-era job across a specialist leadership stack.
Think of it like an Apple chip. A modern system-on-a-chip does not ask one core to handle every task. Different engines handle graphics, machine learning, media and general computing before the system brings them together. Apple's current leadership structure looks similar:
- Cook can absorb part of the geopolitical and policy load as executive chair.
- Khan can protect the supply-chain discipline and operating rhythm.
- Srouji can integrate hardware engineering with chips, batteries, cameras, modems and displays.
- Craig Federighi can continue leading software while Eddy Cue leads Services and Health.
- Ternus can sit above those specialist engines and decide what products Apple should build, how they fit together and where the company should accept risk.
This is not an official Apple description of decision rights. It is our interpretation of the roles Apple has publicly disclosed. But it leads to an important conclusion: Ternus may be able to make Apple more product-led without asking a product engineer to become Tim Cook 2.0.
The structure also creates a risk. A leadership stack only works when one person has final authority. Cook's continued presence can be a stabiliser in Washington, Beijing and the boardroom, but Apple must avoid two centres of gravity. Investors should watch whether major product, capital-allocation and personnel decisions clearly belong to Ternus.
John Ternus vs Tim Cook: What Changes at Apple?
The two executives are not opposites. Ternus spent 25 years inside the company Cook shaped and has called Cook his mentor. Apple is far more likely to evolve than to stage a dramatic reset.
Still, the centre of attention can move.
| Leadership lens | Tim Cook era | Likely Ternus emphasis | Investor implication |
| Core expertise | Operations, scale and global execution | Hardware engineering and product integration | More CEO involvement in product trade-offs |
| Default question | Can Apple build and deliver this at an enormous scale? | Does this technology create a better product? | Potentially more willingness to test new form factors |
| Innovation style | Patient expansion of the ecosystem and Services | Performance, durability, materials and device integration | Improvements may be practical before they are dramatic |
| AI posture | Partnerships plus selective internal investment | AI embedded into devices, sensors and Apple silicon | Hardware may become the delivery system for AI |
| Risk to manage | Supply chain, geopolitics and regulation | Product relevance, AI execution and category creation | The valuation needs more than incremental upgrades |
| Continuity mechanism | Cook held the system together | Cook, Khan, Srouji, Federighi and Cue provide a deep bench | Lower transition risk, but slower visible change |
Reporting on Ternus consistently describes an engineer who pays close attention to performance, battery life, reliability and durability. He has also publicly argued that Apple does not ship technology for technology's sake. The company tries to turn technology into a product experience users do not have to think about.
That philosophy sounds sensible. It also sets a high bar. In AI, waiting until the technology becomes invisible can look exactly like falling behind until the product is finally ready.
Apple’s Business and Valuation at the Start of the John Ternus Era
Ternus is not inheriting a turnaround. He is inheriting a financial fortress priced as though its advantages will remain unusually durable.
Apple stock closed at $316.22 on September 8, giving the company a market capitalisation of about $4.65 trillion. Apple had briefly touched $5 trillion in July before pulling back. Based on reported results through June 2026, we calculate trailing 12-month revenue of about $466.8 billion, net income of $128.9 billion and free cash flow of roughly $136.7 billion.
| Starting metric | ~ Figure | Why it matters |
| AAPL share price | $316.22 | Reference price for the scenario model |
| Market capitalisation | $4.65 trillion | Leaves little room for an ordinary execution story |
| Trailing 12-month revenue | $466.8 billion | Apple already operates at nation-scale revenue |
| Trailing 12-month net income | $128.9 billion | Implies a net margin of about 27.6% |
| Trailing 12-month free cash flow | $136.7 billion | Supports buybacks, dividends and investment |
| Trailing P/E ratio | About 36.3 times | Investors are paying well ahead of current earnings |
| Price-to-free-cash-flow | About 34.0 times | Implied free-cash-flow yield is only about 2.9% |
| Active installed base | More than 2.5 billion devices | A distribution advantage for products and Services |
| Trailing 12-month R&D | $42.9 billion | About 9.2% of revenue and a major test of conversion into products |
Source: Apple filings, Apple Investor Relations, market data and INDmoney calculations.
The business mix explains both Apple's strength and Ternus's challenge.
| Revenue category | Trailing 12-month revenue | Share of total revenue |
| iPhone | $245.5 billion | 52.6% |
| Services | $120.5 billion | 25.8% |
| Wearables, Home and Accessories | $36.3 billion | 7.8% |
| Mac | $35.9 billion | 7.7% |
| iPad | $28.7 billion | 6.1% |
| Total | $466.8 billion | 100% |
Apple still gets more than half its revenue from the iPhone. Services is now the second engine and a far richer one. In fiscal 2025, Apple's product gross margin was 36.8% while Services gross margin was 75.4%. That is why Apple's revenue mix matters more than a simple hardware-versus-software debate. Hardware creates the installed base. The installed base creates demand for Services. High-margin Services fund more research, distribution and buybacks. Each side strengthens the other.
Ternus cannot favour hardware at the expense of that loop. His job is to make the loop spin faster.
How Investors Should Judge John Ternus as Apple CEO
Investors often judge a new CEO on the wrong clock. An iPhone keynote moves the stock in minutes, but the device on stage may reflect four or five years of work. A change in research priorities can happen today but may not reach revenue for years.
The cleanest way to assess Ternus is to separate three clocks.
| Clock | Approximate horizon | What investors can reasonably judge |
| Valuation clock | Daily to quarterly | Sentiment, P/E multiple and expectations |
| Operating clock | 6 to 24 months | Margins, hiring, R&D, supply, Services growth and organisational changes |
| Product clock | 3 to 5 years | New categories, ecosystem behaviour and revenue diversification |
The September 2026 launch belongs mostly to the product clock that started before Ternus became CEO. His first meaningful fingerprints as chief executive should appear earlier in people and priorities, then later in products and financial mix.
This prevents two common mistakes. The first is declaring a product renaissance after one exciting launch. The second is calling the succession a failure because quarterly revenue or margins soften due to a memory shortage, foreign exchange or decisions taken years earlier.
Scenario One: Apple Becomes a Product Company With an Operations Safety Net
The most plausible Ternus version of Apple is not a return to the Steve Jobs era. It is a product-led company sitting on top of Cook's operations and capital-allocation infrastructure.
The CEO could become more involved in decisions such as battery life versus thinness, repairability versus sealed design, local AI compute versus cloud cost and product simplicity versus feature depth. Those sound like engineering debates, but each has financial consequences.
A larger battery can improve retention and upgrade satisfaction but raise component cost. More on-device AI can strengthen privacy and reduce recurring inference expenses but require more expensive chips and memory. Better repairability can extend device life and support regulation but may slow replacement cycles. A thinner device can create excitement but increase manufacturing difficulty.
Ternus's value will not come from always choosing the engineering answer. It will come from knowing which compromise creates the strongest lifetime economics for the ecosystem.
This version of Apple could produce fewer cosmetic upgrades and more system-level gains in performance, battery life, durability, connectivity and health. Those changes rarely generate the loudest launch-day headlines. They can still protect Apple's premium prices and keep users inside the ecosystem for longer.
For investors, the best evidence would be a combination of stable product margins, healthy upgrade rates, lower warranty or quality problems and faster adoption of features that work across several Apple devices.
Scenario Two: Apple Turns AI Into a Device Network, Not Just a Chatbot
The biggest opportunity under Ternus is not simply to make Siri answer questions better. It is to make Apple's devices collectively useful in an AI-first world.
Apple introduced its rebuilt Siri AI in June 2026 with personal context, onscreen awareness, app actions, visual understanding and a system spanning the iPhone, iPad, Mac, Watch, AirPods and Vision Pro. Apple says part of the system runs on device while heavier requests can use Private Cloud Compute. The beta is expected later in 2026, though availability is initially restricted in parts of Europe and China.
Here is the technical idea in plain English. AI models provide reasoning, but devices provide context, sensors, identity, permissions and the ability to act. Think of the model as the brain and Apple's ecosystem as the nervous system. A clever brain is useful. A brain connected to a camera, microphone, watch, payments, messages, calendar, car and home can do far more.
That is where Ternus's hardware background could matter. Reported product work around smart glasses, camera-equipped wearables and home devices points toward what we would call ambient Apple: a network of products that can see, hear and assist while keeping more personal data under Apple's control.
The opportunity has three layers:
- Upgrade demand. Advanced on-device models need newer processors and more memory. Useful AI features can give consumers a reason to replace older devices.
- Higher ecosystem value. A Watch, AirPods or future pair of glasses becomes more useful when it understands what is happening on the iPhone and Mac.
- New recurring revenue. Apple could monetise premium AI capabilities, developer distribution, cloud compute, storage, payments or bundles without needing to own the world's leading foundation model.
There is also a serious risk. If users form their strongest relationship with Gemini, ChatGPT, Claude or another assistant, Apple could keep selling the hardware while losing control of the interface. In that outcome, Apple becomes the luxury landlord while somebody else owns the tenant relationship.
Ternus therefore has to balance two ideas that pull in opposite directions. Apple can rent outside intelligence when it speeds up the product. But it must own enough of the user experience, context and action layer to remain indispensable.
Scenario Three: Apple Builds a Family of New Interfaces
The next Apple growth platform may not be one blockbuster device. It may be a family of interfaces around the iPhone.
Reuters and other credible outlets have reported or discussed a folding iPhone, smart glasses and new AI-centred wearables or home products. These should not be treated as confirmed products until Apple announces them. They are still useful signals because they show where the industry and Apple's reported development work are pointing.
| Possible interface | Strategic purpose | What must be true for it to matter |
| Folding iPhone | Raises premium pricing and combines phone and tablet use | Durability, app experience and demand must justify the price |
| Smart glasses | Puts visual AI and notifications closer to the user | They must be light, socially acceptable and useful without constant charging |
| Camera-enabled AirPods or wearables | Adds environmental context to voice assistance | Privacy controls must be obvious and trusted |
| Home display or robotic device | Gives Siri a persistent place in the home | It needs a use case stronger than a screen that moves |
| Health-focused Watch and AirPods | Turns sensors into preventive and accessibility services | Clinical credibility, regulatory clearance and repeat use are essential |
| Lower-cost Mac | Expands the installed base and future Services funnel | Apple must protect brand perception and margins |
The connecting thread is more important than the individual gadget. Under a product engineer, Apple could stop treating each device as a separate box and design them as different windows into the same personal computing system.
That is a more realistic ambition than finding another iPhone. At Apple's scale, even a commercially successful new device may look small in the income statement. Its larger value can come from raising retention, Services spending and the usefulness of every other Apple product.
Can a Foldable iPhone Really Move Apple Stock?
This is where headline excitement needs financial discipline.
Assume, only for illustration, that Apple sells 10 million folding iPhones in a year at an average price of $2,200. That would generate $22 billion of revenue. It sounds enormous until it is placed beside Apple's trailing revenue of roughly $466.8 billion.
| Illustrative folding iPhone calculation | Amount |
| Units sold | 10 million |
| Average selling price | $2,200 |
| Revenue | $22.0 billion |
| Share of current trailing revenue | 4.7% |
| Gross profit at 36.8% product margin | $8.1 billion |
| Illustrative after-tax incremental profit | About $5 billion |
| Value at 30 times earnings | About $150 billion |
| Share of current Apple market value | About 3.2% |
This is deliberately simplified. It assumes the full device revenue is incremental, uses Apple's fiscal 2025 product gross margin and applies an approximate after-tax profit conversion. Real results would be affected by launch costs, component prices, mix and geography.
The biggest missing item is cannibalisation. If many buyers would otherwise have purchased a $1,200 iPhone Pro, the true incremental revenue is closer to the price premium than the full $2,200. In that case, the financial contribution could be materially smaller.
The lesson is not that a foldable device does not matter. It is that one premium product is unlikely to transform a company already worth $4.65 trillion. For the Apple stock to re-rate sustainably, a new form factor must either sell at far greater scale or strengthen the full ecosystem.
Why Apple’s 2.5 Billion Device Installed Base Could Be the Bigger Opportunity
Apple's installed base offers a different kind of math. Apple has more than 2.5 billion active devices. That figure counts devices, not unique people, so it must not be treated as a subscriber number. Still, it shows how even modest incremental monetisation can become meaningful.
Suppose new AI, cloud, health, payments or developer services generate the equivalent of $2 per month from 20% of the installed device base. That would be 500 million revenue-bearing device equivalents.
| Illustrative ecosystem calculation | $2 per month | $5 per month |
| Revenue-bearing device equivalents | 500 million | 500 million |
| Annual incremental revenue | $12.0 billion | $30.0 billion |
| Gross profit at 75.4% Services margin | $9.0 billion | $22.6 billion |
This is not a forecast and it may double-count people who own several devices. The point is the shape of the economics. A new hardware category can contribute once at the time of sale. A useful service can generate smaller payments repeatedly across a very large base.
The winning Ternus strategy would connect both. Hardware creates new contexts for AI. AI makes the hardware more valuable. The resulting engagement supports Services. That is how a product engineer can affect margins and valuation without turning Apple into a pure software company.
What Is Unlikely to Change Under Apple CEO John Ternus?
Leadership stories invite dramatic predictions. Most of Apple's core behaviour is likely to remain recognisable.
- The ecosystem stays central. Apple's advantage comes from the interaction among devices, software, distribution, payments and Services. Breaking that integration would destroy more value than it creates.
- Privacy remains part of the product. Ternus may change the technical mix between on-device and cloud AI, but privacy is both a corporate value and a commercial differentiator. Apple has built Private Cloud Compute around that promise.
- Services remain financially essential. A hardware engineer cannot ignore a business with a fiscal 2025 gross margin of 75.4%. The question is whether Apple can grow Services through better utility while regulators weaken some App Store economics.
- Buybacks probably continue. Apple spent $62.1 billion repurchasing stock in the first nine months of fiscal 2026. A shrinking share count helps earnings per share compound even when net income grows more slowly. Ternus's pay is also heavily linked to relative shareholder return, which supports continuity in capital discipline.
- Apple will still enter markets late. Ternus's engineering background may increase product ambition, but Apple's scale makes careless launches expensive. The company is more likely to wait, integrate and premiumise than to chase every technology cycle.
Apple Stock 2030 Scenario Analysis: Bear, Base and Bull Cases
The Apple stock starts the Ternus era with a demanding valuation. At roughly 36.3 times trailing earnings, Apple does not merely need to remain excellent. It needs to deliver enough growth and durability to defend a premium multiple.
The following model is a framework, not a price target. It starts with trailing revenue of $466.8 billion, 14.61 billion shares and a reference price of $316.22. We then vary revenue growth, net margin, annual share-count reduction and the 2030 P/E multiple.
| 2030 scenario | Execution squeeze (Bear) | Engineering compounder (Base) | Product renaissance (Bull) |
| Revenue CAGR, 2026 to 2030 | 2% | 6% | 9% |
| 2030 revenue | $505 billion | $589 billion | $659 billion |
| 2030 net margin | 25% | 28% | 30% |
| Annual share-count decline | 1.0% | 1.5% | 2.0% |
| 2030 EPS | $9.00 | $12.00 | $14.67 |
| Assumed 2030 P/E | 24 times | 30 times | 34 times |
| Implied 2030 share price | $216 | $360 | $499 |
| Implied 2030 market value | $3.0 trillion | $5.0 trillion | $6.7 trillion |
| Price change from $316.22 | -32% | +14% | +58% |
| Approximate annualised price return | -9.1% | +3.3% | +12.1% |
Returns exclude dividends, taxes, and transaction costs. Figures are rounded.
The middle scenario contains the article's most important valuation insight. Apple could grow revenue at 6% a year, expand margins slightly and keep reducing its share count, yet the share price would rise only around 14% by 2030 if the valuation settles at 30 times earnings. The business would have performed well. The stock would have spent much of that performance growing into its starting price.
That is the burden of entering a new CEO era near $5 trillion.
The product-renaissance case needs several things to work together: useful AI that stimulates upgrades, new interfaces that strengthen the ecosystem, durable Services growth and enough pricing power to lift net margin to 30%. Even then, the model assumes investors still pay 34 times earnings in 2030. That is possible, but demanding.
The downside case does not require Apple to collapse. Revenue still grows, the company remains very profitable and buybacks continue. The damage comes from slower growth, modest margin pressure and the market deciding that 24 times earnings is a fairer price. At this valuation, multiple compression can hurt even when the company itself remains healthy.
What Could Go Wrong Under a Product-Led CEO?
The Ternus thesis is attractive because Apple appears to need stronger product momentum. The same thesis creates its own failure modes.
1. Hardware becomes the answer to a software problem: A foldable phone, glasses or a moving home screen cannot compensate for an assistant that is unreliable or unavailable in major markets. Apple has announced a rebuilt Siri AI, but shipping a beta is different from making it indispensable.
2. Apple rents too much of the intelligence layer: Using outside models can reduce time to market and capital intensity. It can also weaken differentiation if competitors can access similar intelligence. Apple needs proprietary value in personal context, privacy, device actions, silicon and distribution.
3. Services economics face regulatory erosion: Services delivered $120.5 billion of trailing revenue in our calculation and historically carried far higher gross margins than products. App Store rules, alternative payments and search-distribution arrangements face legal and regulatory scrutiny. A more product-focused CEO cannot treat this as somebody else's issue because Services supports Apple's premium valuation.
4. New devices add complexity without adding a platform: Apple's power comes from simplicity. Too many overlapping wearables, displays and accessories could create a crowded portfolio without changing user behaviour. A new category should either become large itself or make the rest of the ecosystem more valuable.
5. The operations edge gets taken for granted: Apple's June 2026 quarter showed why execution still matters. Revenue rose 16% to $109.4 billion, but management warned of heavier supply constraints and pressure from memory costs in the September quarter. Company gross margin was 50.1% including roughly two percentage points of tariff refunds. Adjusted for that benefit, it was about 48.1%. Product vision does not protect earnings when key components are unavailable or too expensive.
6. Research spending becomes an input trophy: Apple's trailing R&D expense is about $42.9 billion by our calculation. Spending more does not prove innovation. Investors should care about conversion: how quickly research becomes shipped capability, how widely users adopt it and whether it creates revenue, retention or margin.
The John Ternus Scorecard Investors Should Track
No single quarter will answer whether Ternus is working. The following scorecard connects leadership choices to outcomes investors can actually observe.
| Question | Signal to watch | What would strengthen the thesis | What would weaken it |
| Is AI becoming useful? | Siri adoption, app actions and repeat use | Measurable engagement and wider geographic availability | Repeated delays or low usage after launch |
| Is AI helping the business? | Upgrade rates, premium mix and AI-related Services | Higher device demand or recurring revenue | Higher compute cost without monetisation |
| Are new products creating a platform? | Attach rates across Watch, AirPods, glasses, home and iPhone | Multiple devices become more useful together | Expensive standalone products with weak retention |
| Is Apple diversifying? | Revenue growth outside iPhone | Other categories outgrow iPhone while iPhone remains healthy | iPhone concentration falls only because phone revenue shrinks |
| Are Services durable? | Growth and gross margin | Utility-led growth across cloud, payments and subscriptions | Regulatory losses or slowing App Store economics |
| Is R&D converting? | Product cadence and adoption | More shipped capabilities from the $42.9 billion spend | Rising spend with cancellations and delays |
| Is operations discipline intact? | Adjusted gross margin, supply and inventory | Stable availability and margins through component cycles | Missed demand or frequent constraint warnings |
| Are buybacks still productive? | Share count, not just dollars spent | Consistent reduction at sensible valuations | Large spending with limited share-count decline |
| Does Ternus clearly lead? | Major appointments and strategic decisions | Clear accountability from the CEO | Persistent uncertainty between CEO and executive chair |
This framework also guards against narrative bias. A charismatic keynote is not evidence of financial progress. A weak quarter caused by component shortages is not proof of strategic failure. The strongest signal is a pattern across several rows over several years.
Author's Take
John Ternus should not try to out-Cook Tim Cook or imitate Steve Jobs. Both comparisons set the wrong objective.
His opportunity is more specific. Preserve the supply-chain, Services and capital-allocation engine that made Apple financially exceptional, then use his product authority to reconnect hardware, software and AI around problems consumers actually notice.
The best version of Apple under Ternus is not a gadget factory. It is an ambient personal-computing system in which the iPhone remains the anchor while the Watch, AirPods, Mac, home devices and eventually glasses give AI more useful context. Apple's advantage would not be that it owns the biggest AI model. It would be that it owns the trusted devices, identity, permissions and distribution through which AI acts.
The near-term excitement will centre on a foldable iPhone and other visible hardware. Our math suggests that it is too small a lens. Ten million ultra-premium devices could create a successful business without materially transforming a $4.65 trillion company, especially after cannibalisation. The larger prize is turning new hardware into recurring value across more than 2.5 billion active devices.
The valuation makes execution unforgiving. At roughly 36 times trailing earnings and 34 times free cash flow, Apple stock already assumes an unusually durable company. Ternus does not need to save Apple. He needs to prove that a near-$5 trillion Apple can still discover meaningful new growth without sacrificing the economics that brought it here.
That is a harder job than launching one more great product. It is also the only version of the succession story that can genuinely move the needle for AAPL investors.