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Total income has been quite up-and-down. It dropped sharply from ₹460.1 crore in FY23 to ₹119.1 crore in FY24, mainly because regulatory changes cut down its marketing fee income significantly. After that, revenue jumped to ₹693.2 crore in FY25 and was ₹469.4 crore in the first half of FY26, largely because it acquired Turtlemint Insurance Broking Services Private Limited (TIB) and then consolidated (combined into its own financials) the insurance distribution commissions it earns. You can see the same shift in platform premium (the total premium sold through the platform), which rose to ₹2,945.9 crore in FY25, and around 75% of that came from outside the top 30 cities.
Even with that top-line growth (overall revenue growth), the company is still making losses. Losses widened to ₹125.1 crore in the first half of FY26 from ₹98.9 crore in the same period earlier, mainly because it paid higher commissions to digital partners to push volumes, and also had some exceptional expenses linked to financial instruments (things like specific funding-related accounting items that can create one-time costs). Meanwhile, total assets have been steadily shrinking, from ₹900.4 crore in FY23 to ₹472.7 crore in the latest half-year, mostly because net worth has been getting depleted by the accumulated losses over time.
It’s in a strong spot because it has the biggest network of certified advisors compared to similar companies, with a 15.97% share. As of September 30, 2025, it had over 6.03 lakh registered partners helping sell insurance across India.
A big chunk of its business comes from smaller towns and cities, often called B30+ markets (basically, places outside the top big financial cities). These areas contributed 74.79% of its total platform premium (the total insurance amount customers paid) in the six months ended September 30, 2025. Its network reaches 19,153 pin codes, covering 97.80% of India.
Its spending on technology seems to be paying off in day-to-day efficiency. Premium productivity per employee (how much premium each employee helps generate) went up from ₹86 lakh in FY23 to ₹1.25 crore in FY25. In simple terms, it’s been able to grow volumes without needing to add people at the same pace. Which, however, dropped to ₹68.1 lakh during H1 FY26.
It appears to keep partners around, and partners also seem to earn more over time. For example, partners who joined in the FY20 cohort increased their average earnings by 2.8 times by FY25. When partners see their income grow, they’re more likely to stick around, which helps the company maintain a stable and productive network.
Even though the company is still reporting overall losses, the underlying business metrics look healthier. Its Service EBITDA margin (profit from core services, a “core operating profit” measure) was 11.04% for the six months ended September 30, 2025, and 11.89% on a proforma basis for FY25. That suggests the core operations can generate decent margins before head-office and other overhead costs.
The company has been losing money for a while. It reported a restated loss of ₹125.15 crore for the six months ended September 30, 2025, and a proforma loss of ₹202.56 crore for FY25 (proforma means adjusted as if a certain structure/assumption applied for the full year). If losses continue, it can eat into net worth (the company’s own capital after liabilities) and make growth harder to fund.
A lot of its revenue is tied to general insurance companies, which made up 92.46% of revenue in the six months ended September 30, 2025. Within that, motor insurance is a key driver, so if rules change, pricing tightens, or demand cools in motor, the company’s income could take a real hit.
Regulation has already shown it can reshape the business quickly. Income from marketing fees dropped to zero in the six months ended September 30, 2025, from ₹369.75 crore in FY23. If regulators change how commissions or fees work again, the company may have to rethink its revenue model and could see earnings swing.
Right now, the company depends heavily on its subsidiary, TIB, which it acquired in May 2024. TIB brought in 97.36% of revenue in the six months ended September 30, 2025. That’s efficient in one sense, but it’s also a concentration risk; if TIB faces operational issues, compliance trouble, or slower growth, the impact hits the whole group directly.
Keeping and growing the partner network isn’t cheap. Partner acquisition and retention costs (money spent to onboard partners and keep them active) were 76.58% of total expenses in the six months ended September 30, 2025. If these costs stay this high while the company expands, getting to profitability could remain a long and uncertain journey.
Company | Platform Premium | Operating Revenue | Adjusted EBITDA | Profit |
Turtlemint | ₹2,946 Cr | ₹663 Cr | -₹177 Cr | -₹194 Cr |
₹23,486 Cr | ₹4,977 Cr | ₹333 Cr | ₹353 Cr |
| Promoters | 17.05% | |
| Name | Role | Stakeholding |
| Dhirendra Nalin Mahyavanshi | Promoter | 8.72% |
| Anand Rohidas Prabhudesai | Promoter | 8.33% |
| Public | 82.95% | |
| Name | Role | Stakeholding |
| Nexus Ventures IV, Ltd. | Public | 21.68% |
| Peak XV Partners Investments V | Public | 20.84% |
| Jungle Ventures III Investment Holding | Public | 4.54% |
| SIG Global India Fund I, LLP | Public | 3.82% |
| Amansa Investments Ltd. | Public | 3.56% |
| GGV VII Investments Pte. Ltd. | Public | 3.14% |
| Blume Ventures Fund 1X | Public | 2.92% |
| Amfam VC Fund III, LP | Public | 2.89% |
| Nexus Ventures VI Holdings, LLC | Public | 2.37% |
| MassMutual Ventures US II LLC | Public | 2.02% |
| MW XO Digital Finance Fund Holdco Ltd. | Public | 1.78% |
| Terrapin Lux SCSP | Public | 1.78% |
| Blume Ventures (Opportunities) Fund IIA | Public | 1.78% |
| Kunal Shah | Public | 1.45% |
| Others | 8.38% |
Turtlemint hasn’t shared exact IPO dates yet. What we do know is that the company has filed its Updated Draft Red Herring Prospectus (UDRHP) with SEBI. In that filing, it’s proposed a fresh issue of shares worth ₹660.72 crore and an offer for sale (OFS) of around 2.86 crore equity shares.
The promoters are Anand Rohidas Prabhudesai and Dhirendra Nalin Mahyavanshi. Together, they hold 17.05% of the company’s pre-IPO share capital. They’re not just names on paper either, both are actively running the business, with Anand as Chief Operating Officer (COO, who manages day-to-day execution) and Dhirendra as Chief Executive Officer (CEO, who leads overall strategy).
Turtlemint’s closest competition comes from digital insurance distributors like Policybazaar (PB Fintech Ltd.) and InsuranceDekho. But it’s not only online players, traditional sellers like individual agents, banks, and even insurance companies selling directly to customers also compete hard for the same buyers. So it’s a crowded market, with older offline networks and newer app-based platforms all trying to grab share in insurance distribution.
Most of Turtlemint’s money comes from commissions and fees for selling financial products; think of it as earning a cut for helping a customer buy a policy or product. In the six months ended September 30, 2025, 98.91% of revenue came from this. A big part of that depends on general insurance, especially motor insurance, sold through its partner network, so the health of that segment matters a lot to its overall income.